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## **ПРОФЕССИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ИНОСТРАННЫЙ ЯЗЫК**

Методическая разработка по лабораторным занятиям  
для студентов направления подготовки  
41.04.05 Международные отношения

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## Введение

Изучение иностранного языка является неотъемлемой частью подготовки специалистов в области международных отношений. Данная методическая разработка была составлена по дисциплине «Профессиональный иностранный язык» для студентов направления подготовки 41.04.05 Международные отношения.

В соответствии с задачами дисциплины (сформировать общелингвистические представления о современном иностранном языке; привить навыки разговорной и письменной речи, умение читать и переводить на русский язык (без словаря и со словарем) тексты профессиональной направленности) представлены тексты по основным темам, включающие в себя лексические единицы и грамматические структуры, которыми должны владеть студенты в рамках данного курса.

Благодаря чтению и переводу данных текстов, освоению активной лексики, а также используемых грамматических конструкций студенты должны овладеть следующими навыками и умениями: продуктивного активного и пассивного освоения лексики английского языка; овладения грамматическим строем английского языка; подготовленного устного монологического высказывания на английском языке в пределах изучаемых тем; письменной речи на английском языке.

## **Text 1. The Global South as a Political Project**

The term “South” appeared in the international vocabulary in 1980 and in the following decade its association with the predicate “Global” happened due to the end of the Cold War and the Globalization discourse and the dynamics of enlargement. Because of the reference regarding poor and developing countries in contrast to the richest and developed ones, the “Global South” is the heir of the outdated “Third World” concept. In both denominations, the classification of the world considers the stage of economic development towards modernity as the main parameter. The understanding of such modernity and development is strongly associated with the idea of progress or evolution. However, as well as the idea of the Third World, the Global South cannot be seen simply as a set of non-developed and non-modern countries localized in the ex-colonial zones of the globe. There are many different meanings for both categories, which should not be understood exclusively in a geographical or territorial sense. The two terms were capable of projecting a subaltern geopolitical identity, presenting different ways to belonging in the international system.

In this view, the Global South “functions as more than a metaphor for underdevelopment”. The twentieth-century anticolonial movement, the Bandung Conference (1955), the Non-Aligned Movement (1961), and Cuba’s Tricontinentalism (1966) are some examples on which Global South has its origins and influences. For this, the concept can work as a symbolic designation meant to capture the semblance of cohesion that emerged when the former colonial entities engaged in political projects of decolonization and moved towards the realization of a postcolonial international.

Thus, the term alludes to the history of imperialism and colonialism, as well as to the violence suffered by its different members.

The members of the Global South are not necessarily nation-states and they can be “defined in transnational social terms” or even “a set of practices, attitudes, and relations”. Such understandings about what is the “Global South” allows thinking of it as a category without a central command, defined scale, or exclusive form. Therefore, it is important to recognize the great variety of actors, discourses, institutions, and movements that take part in this category. The Global South is not a monolithic, cohesive, coherent, and homogenous entity characterized by the absence of conflicts and interests. For both analytical and political

purposes, it is important to not simplify or romanticize the idea of the Global South. The existence of “south in the north” and “north in the south” complexifies the (re)production of (neo)colonial and (neo)imperial power, especially in the current context of increasing global inequalities. Thus, the rejection of everything regarding the “Global North” itself can be a dangerous position and its complexity needs to be taken into consideration in the same way as the “Global South”.

The simplification, reduction, and essentialization elapse from the mobilization of binary categories such as center/periphery, west/east, or first/third world. Politically, the self-recognition of one’s own subaltern position can be operated as “strategic essentialism”, according to Gayatri Spivak (Morton, 2004). Thus, the Global South imaginary is identified with the history of the peripheries, the east / “rest” and the third world. The reaffirmation of subalternity does not allow forgetting the colonial difference until the present. It is possible to verify a subaltern position regarding the international system, the economic dynamics, the cultural expressions, the academic structures, the thinking systems. The Eurocentric character of modern imperial power created resistance against Western domination (HURRELL, 2013).

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the “Global South” was the most powerful force to present and claim future alternatives to neoliberal globalization, as well as the continuity of struggles on decolonization. From the civil society’s perspective, “another globalization is possible” was the slogan of the World Social Forum; the struggles against racism have reverberated in different institutions; the environment and indigenous people’s rights protection became part of the international agenda; experiences of decolonization have promoted the “new Latin-American constitutionalism” and other kinds of contestation around the world, such as demands on decolonizing academic curriculum or historical monuments and museums. The Southern Theories and Epistemologies research agenda have gathered debates about academic dependency, the geopolitics of knowledge, and other logic of knowing. All those examples show and reinforce the understanding of the Global South as a multifaceted movement that underscores the need for a postcolonial international community of interest that advances the objectives of equality, freedom, and mutuality in the form of a new ethos of power and subjectivity through foreign

policy, international solidarity, and responsibility to self and others in an international order free of the institutional legacies of colonialism.

From a governmental and intergovernmental point of view, the first decade of the twentieth-first century has heard witness to the emergence of powers like Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, that together formed the BRICS. Latin America had experienced the so-called Left Turn or Pink Tide, following the democratic elections of leftist leaderships in different countries. In a larger context, South-South cooperation was stimulated within the new paradigm of development proposed by the United Nations Development Program “Forging a Global South”, published in 2003 (Dirlik, 2007). According to Gray and Gills, “South-South cooperation (SSC) has been a key organizing concept and a set of practices in pursuit of these historical changes through a vision of mutual benefit and solidarity among the disadvantaged of the world system”. The limits of this new arrangement are clear: The South had to seek development in the global capitalist economy. This also signified an important shift in the content of development-away from an earlier emphasis on development as national development (or the development of the whole nation).

Because of constraints and the reinforcement of the global capitalist neoliberal agenda, the South-South cooperation has a limited potential to delinking or decolonizing the post-colonial international order. This is very different from the revolutionary role performed by the Third World in making a decolonial inflection in the bipolar Cold War dynamics. If “the solutions to the South’s problems must be part of global solutions” as Dirlik pointed, the absence of alternatives outside the market-oriented competition and the neoliberal ideology offers reduced possibilities to construct new paths to development, to question what kind of the development or even why development. Furthermore, the different structural constraints of the post-colonial international order – including the state-centered form – raise suspicion to the more critical or radical voices, which are seeing the “Global South” as a product made by the “Global North”.

The Global South is a political project permanently disputed by progressive and regressive forces in the multipolar context. Nowadays, the Global South has several challenges to maintain itself as an indispensable political project towards a fairer and equal world. The pandemic, the decrease of democratic regimes, and the consequences of the “Anthropocene” are radically modifying the current global context.

The reconstruction of the idea of humankind, the continuity of the decolonization projects, the retrieval of democracy, and the rescue of politics from the neoliberal rationality will be urgent tasks of the Global South along with the South of the Global North.

**Text2. Opinion — Paradiplomacy in Times of Pandemic:  
The Paths Ahead**

Covid-19 has produced changes in all areas and will continue impacting the social, economic and political structures. The field of International Relations is no stranger to this phenomenon, where an already beaten multilateralism faces new challenges that further threaten global interdependence. These new global circumstances force non-central governments to adapt and their internationalization (paradiplomacy) is no exception. Although much has already been written about the depth and scope of the effects Covid-19 is producing, this is an issue that will continue to be debated. Although at this stage it would be irresponsible to point out what the world will be when the pandemic finally ends, it is necessary to start asking about possible exit scenarios in order to prepare ourselves.

During this world crisis, paradiplomacy has shown that it has a role to play. The internationalization of non-central governments, especially through decentralized cooperation generates direct benefits for the sub-state entities. For instance, Barcelona (Spain) has decided to spend 400,000 euros to fight Covid-19 in cities abroad, like Amman (Jordan), Saïda (Lebanon), Tetouan (Morocco) and Maputo (Mozambique), among others. Likewise, Frankfurt (Germany) has donated 10,000 euros to its twin city of Milan (Italy) to help in the fight against the pandemic. In South America, which is currently facing winter and probably the worst moments of the pandemic, non-central governments have also turned to their international ties. For example, the province of Córdoba in Argentina turned to its twinning agreement with the Chinese city of Chongqing, to obtain medical supplies. In the same way, the Bío Bío region in Chile asserted its long relationship with the Chinese province of Hubei, to access the essential masks to combat the pandemic.

In parallel to this increase in paradiplomatic initiatives, states have also exercised greater control over areas that, although within their exclusive competence, had been relaxed during the rise of globalization. Under this light, central governments have implemented restrictions to

free transit, tightened border controls and amplified their presence in international relations. In this sense, it is worth asking two questions: (1) Has the pandemic contributed to or hindered paradiplomacy? (2) Will these effects endure in time?

Firstly, the internationalization of non-central governments has faced a double dynamic. On the one hand, states have augmented their presence in the international arena through unilateral responses to the crisis. On the other hand, states seem to have deviated from multilateral organizations (already in question prior to the pandemic). This has favored the fragmentation of the global scene and seems to have increased levels of competition (for example, for medical supplies). This has also affected non-central governments, which frequently have had to confront their central governments regarding circumstances linked to the pandemic. For example, closure of borders left large contingents of migrants stranded without work in many cities, making the local authorities responsible to handle a situation generated by the central government (as did the city of Iquique in Chile). Also, many sub-state units required their states to declare quarantine in their territories or even went as far as unilateral declaration (as seen in the Mexican state of Jalisco and the Brazilian state of São Paulo).

On the other hand, the pandemic has once again shown that the international behavior of non-central governments does not necessarily follow the actions of their states. In recent months, while global focus turned to the central governments' unilateral actions, international cooperation in healthcare was brought to the attention of the sub-state units revitalizing various paradiplomatic initiatives. Several relevant actions were born in this area, such as Cities for Global Health. Likewise, cooperation within organizations such as United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), UN Habitat, the AL-LAs Project, the International Urban Cooperation and Metropolis, among others, was revitalized through the exchange of experiences to face the crisis in all its dimensions.

Therefore, the pandemic has had a dual impact on paradiplomacy. On the one hand, the presence of states is regaining its prominence in the global scene (both effectively and relatively), this can put in jeopardy the interdependence gained during the rise of globalization and, in turn, hinder the internationalization of sub-state units. On the other hand, non-central governments are also innovating in their links and generating



new spaces of cooperation, which is contributing to the development of paradiplomacy.

Secondly, there is the longer-term question regarding how this trend may impact the future of paradiplomacy. At this point it is not possible to affirm with any degree of certainty that the changes produced in the matter of state presence or decentralized cooperation will last over time. However, there is a third component that can generate a substantive change in how non-central governments have so far internationalized: the use of virtual platforms to hold international meetings.

The closing of borders and the reduction of air traffic at the international level, as well as the social distancing and quarantine at the domestic level, have had a direct impact on the congresses, summits, seminars and other face-to-face meetings that were scheduled during 2020. Practically, all these encounters have been canceled, rescheduled or migrated to digital platforms. The latter did have a significant effect on the possibilities of participation that the smaller intermediate and local governments. The emergence of virtual platforms for holding meetings, both ordinary meetings and seminars on specific subjects such as health, gender, transport or economy, makes the paradiplomatic practice available to all non-central governments and not only to those with the resources and times necessary to embark on international trips.

The post-Covid-19 paradiplomacy scenario sets three major questions: (1) Will states emerge with an enlarged international role that further limits non-central governments participation in the international arena? (2) Will the renewed momentum of decentralized and health cooperation networks continue? And (3) will broader participation of non-central governments be secured through virtual platforms? To the first two questions we can only venture opinions, but the third we must actively answer and work so that the pandemic leaves us with a more diverse and inclusive world, at least in terms of paradiplomacy.

### **Text3. Understanding Ukraine and Belarus: A Memoir**

In any memoir, it is always difficult to decide what to include and what to leave out. I decided to write this one as a result of prompting from some of my students who have often encouraged me to put some of the stories of my travels on paper. But no writer really knows whether their experiences are unique or common, whether their insights are in

any way original. Still, I convinced myself that there were some unusual things about my own.

First of all, my period of development as a scholar coincided with the later years of the Cold War, the collapse of Communism in eastern Europe, and the fall of the Soviet Union. Moreover, I had spent this period both as an analyst and a graduate student, and began my academic career precisely during the time the Soviet system collapsed, and just a month before the failed putsch in Moscow that heralded the end of Gorbachev's leadership, although not in the manner the putschists had intended.

Second, I do think my engagement with Chernobyl and the disaster of 1986 to be something worth relating. This book contains original comments I made in my diary during the time of my visit there, largely unedited, though some of my 1980s prose seems alien and opinionated to me today. The disaster continues to draw public interest, thanks to new books and the documentary series of 2019 on HBO/Sky Television that evoked much anger in the Kremlin, but was generally lauded elsewhere.

Third, my studies pertain to areas of much dispute, and even warfare, over historical memory, which has affected and influenced many scholars of Ukraine in particular. The time period coincided with the rapid development of social media, which has meant that propaganda on both sides – but particularly in Russia – has been rife, and those expressing opinions on sites such as Facebook and Twitter are not necessarily, and perhaps not usually from the academic domain. It is no longer possible to express views that do not coincide with one or another prevailing narrative and not receive a torrent of abuse, often from people we do not know and have no wish to know.

Though Russia is a part of this monograph, the nations I know best, Ukraine and Belarus, feature most. They are starting to redefine their identities, often based on historical memory, and most often, in one way or another, the Second World War. Official and unofficial narratives often pay little heed to history. In Ukraine, memory is the source of serious polemics, arguments, violence, and commemoration and these escalated in the period 2013-2019 to levels never hitherto witnessed. With an oligarch and chocolate magnate at the helm, Ukraine's position became more narrowly defined. Russia was the enemy and Ukraine's path was with Europe. At the same time there were contradictions because during the height of this hybrid and real

warfare, Russian exports to Ukraine were actually increasing. But few noticed that or, if they did, expected it would not last long.

Western politicians, writers, and scholars came to Ukraine in this period and most embraced the uprising and perceived it as a quest for democracy and freedom, away from authoritarianism and the remnants of the Soviet past. But as new president Volodymyr Zelensky perceived, what most Ukrainians really needed were better living standards and security and less ideology or street renaming. In many ways these desires were similar to those of Russians in the late 1990s, with the hapless, absent, and increasingly uninterested Boris Yeltsin at the helm.

For my own part, these disputes have had an impact on my career and continue to do so. In one sense, these memoirs in part are a narrative of my relations with two communities: with Ukrainians both at home and in Ukraine, from one who worked closely with the community for many years and then found himself outside it, even ostracized in some circles; and in Belarus, where I have not had the same experience because the country is more authoritarian and the opposition has not had an opportunity to break out of this pattern and influence national development. And in my home of Edmonton, there is no Belarusian community conducting organized activities. Moreover, it has rarely been unified in North America as a whole since the declaration of independence in 1991.

Simply put, it is very difficult in 2020 to be an objective and humanitarian scholar, working and researching at a distance from the events of the recent past and even those in earlier periods. The overriding symbol of the current interpretations outside academia is nationalism, of many varieties, but with ethnic nationalism in the ascendancy. Fortunately, in my view, it does not represent all of Ukraine, or even the majority. And invasion of and warfare in one's country only tends to catalyze and heighten such sentiments. That would be the case anywhere, though perhaps not of such extreme varieties.

I have basically adhered to chronology in this memoir, from earliest times – in my case the 1950s – to the present, interspersing some personal events, both happy and tragic, as well as some stories that might entertain, which in their own way are as revealing about the nature of the societies described than any scholarly publication. Occasionally I have resorted to a narrative of political changes, but only to provide some explanation and context for those less familiar with the events described. If there is a theme it is of the value of open-

mindedness, humanitarianism, and academic freedom in the 21st century, a period of incomplete news and “fake” news, when information is overloaded on our laptops and phones, but it is hard to discern what is of real value. Those that have researched more deeply are often derided for their conclusions because they do not coincide with the preferred narrative of the army of scribes on Twitter or Facebook.

Universities, which have been my main career focal point, are now in financial plight in my province of Alberta, and the Arts and Humanities, in particular, the subject of severe budget cuts. In some cases, disciplines that were once taken for granted have to justify their existence, often from student enrolments or students’ future careers, while administrations of universities are bureaucratized and bloated, appealing to business and engineering students rather than those who wish to pursue studies purely from academic interest. The problem is Canada-wide. In Vancouver in the summer of 2019, I was interested to hear a university Chair of History opine that he advised students not to pursue PhDs because they had no future ahead of them should they do so. There were simply no jobs available for those completing dissertations.

I was fortunate that my introduction to academic life preceded such sentiments, and was allowed to research the former Soviet Union and publish what I wanted. My scholarly career also took certain directions that coincided with public interest, such as the Chernobyl disaster (Chornobyl in Ukrainian), memory politics at the time of Euromaidan in Ukraine, and debates on the Second World War that continue today. In Belarus, the legacy of Stalin remains strong, and my current project has set itself the goal of uncovering some of the events of the late 1930s and early 1940s, and publicizing them for the benefit of the Belarusian public, and yet recognizing that they may prefer not to know.

It is time surely to be rid of myths or illusions about Stalinism. He has left his mark on these societies along with those that followed him along his cruel and ideological path, devoid of any human feeling. That is as close to an academic “mission” as I have ever acknowledged. Historians, after all, are supposed to remain dispassionate and detached. A few of us think we still are.

#### **Text4. Opinion – Impacts and Restrictions to Human Rights During COVID-19**

The COVID-19 pandemic is a complex emergency, a biological and sanitary disaster that has impacted the entire world. Its multidimensionality is also present in the responses to it (health, security, economic, and political aspects), and a relevant element that ought to be present in the design and implementation of measures to face the new coronavirus implicates human rights. The impacts of COVID-19 on human rights can be divided into three main groups: 1) human rights affected, 2) vulnerable groups (both preexisting and whose vulnerability emerged from the pandemic), and 3) systemic impacts.

There are human rights touched by COVID-19 in terms of access to prevention and treatment, among which are the right to health (both physical and mental, and in terms of preventive actions to avoid contamination and remedy, and actions that allow access to health care); access to water and sanitary measures; access to information; and non-discrimination (in access and rights). Then, there are the rights impacted by the necessary responses to the pandemic, such as freedom of movement (shelter in place and ability to leave one's home); freedom of assembly and association; right to work; labor rights; access to work and income; right to education, access to food security, and right to private property.

Besides these, some rights demand responses to be in place in order to be protected or not violated, such as the ones relating to humanitarian assistance, economic aid, and measures to prevent the increase in inequalities. And, lastly, some rights have been violated in the responses to COVID-19, such as freedom of expression, the right to privacy (encompassing data protection and protection against intrusive surveillance techniques), and non-discrimination (including the prohibition of xenophobia).

Human rights are fundamental, basic, and universal. Human rights are central to the life-projects of individuals, they comprise the core values of most societies (including the international community), and define human dignity. Consequently, restrictions imposed upon them are limited. First, they must be established by law – in International Law, for instance, in Article 4(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the specific provisions of the rights to freedom of

expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, in the human rights conventions.

Assistance in interpreting these restrictions are provided in General Comments 5 and 29 of the United Nations Human Rights Committee. Second, some rights are absolute and may not be suspended at all, such as the prohibition of torture. Third, only those rights which must be suspended to deal with the emergency may be limited. And fourth, the suspensions must be temporary, necessary, legal, and proportional.

The proportionality element requires, on the one hand, that States seek the least harmful measures possible in dealing with the emergency, and, on the other hand, it is closely related to the protection of vulnerable groups.

Vulnerable groups, in general, are identified by gender (women and LGBTI+ persons); age (children and the elderly); other specific conditions (such as disability, chronic illnesses, or lack of resources – such as for homeless persons); or status (prisoners, detainees, refugees, asylum seekers, ethnic/national minorities, and indigenous peoples). All of these vulnerable groups have been affected by COVID-19, for instance by domestic violence, sexual violence, limitation of access to legal abortion, “triple work shifts” (as women’s work has exponentially increased at work and home), restrictions in education, restriction in access to school meals, access to health systems, accessibility in general, closing of borders, exposure to risk in deliveries and essential works, detention conditions, inclusion in public policies and lack of specific and tailored public policies in the pandemic, as well as discrimination.

The COVID-19 emergency, however, has also created vulnerability for groups that are not generally thought of as vulnerable, such as health workers, essential workers, workers in the entertainment/cultural and the food industry, and journalists. It has, furthermore, exacerbated existing inequalities (social, economic, and in terms of access), thus impacting some groups disproportionately.

This reflects systemic problems in the societies at large. But the COVID-19 pandemic has brought forth other systemic issues. One issue relates to access to justice, with the judicial systems paralyzed and/or trying to figure out ways to reinvent or update their procedures to allow for access. In addition, worldwide calls to end systemic racism and reform police departments that have exercised excessive violence with regard to vulnerable groups reveal another systemic societal problem.

A second issue demands a reflection on the role and adequate access to technology, as, on the one hand, responses to the pandemic need to be globally shared, and on the other, a plethora of gadgets, tools, and apps have been the solution for some, while internet access remains unattainable for millions. The other side of the coin is the lack of control and incentive for the removal of misinformation and fake cures for COVID-19 being widely spread on the internet and followed by people who have no access to better information.

Third, there are challenges to democracy. Responses to polls about the pandemic have revealed that some people consider authoritarian regimes better able to deal with the pandemic than democracies. An understandable perception given that democracies require the consent of the governed to agree to the measures imposed upon them, whereas authoritarian regimes do not require such consent and in a democracy not all people will grant their consent resulting often in a less than perfect outcome. As democracies are the best environment for human rights, weakening democracies impacts human rights protection.

It is clear that the COVID-19 pandemic has had an important impact on human rights. Actions need to be taken to fight the emergency, but human rights need to be taken into consideration and be respected even during a pandemic.

### **Text5. Trump's Foreign Policy Doctrine of Uncertainty**

Donald Trump's foreign policy is a matter of continuous controversy and intense scrutiny. This interest stems from the fact that the arena of international relations and the field of American foreign policy are witnessing significant alterations as a consequence of the actions of the Trump administration. The objectives of this article are to identify the defining characteristics of Trump's foreign policy and to assess their faithfulness to traditional and modern-era foreign policy schools. The analysis puts the nature of Pax-Americana and US exceptionalism face to face with the assumption of a post-American world. It also examines the 'Trump Doctrine' as what Trump himself described as a 'brand new' foreign policy (Curran). Thus, this article reflects on the extent to which Trump is establishing a new school of American foreign policy.

A presidential doctrine is a constant practice of a particular political ideology which can be defined as, a set of ideas, beliefs, values,

and opinions, exhibiting a recurring pattern, that competes deliberately as well as unintentionally over providing plans of action for public policy making, in an attempt to justify, explain, contest, or change the social and political arrangements and processes of a political community (International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences).

Historically, there have existed four major schools that are eligible to meet these characteristics and requirements. These Schools are the focus of political historian Walter Russell Mead's *Special Providence*. First, he identifies the Hamiltonian School as realist and interventionist, which describes the belief system once held by Alexander Hamilton and based on economic and hegemonic stability to ensure a superpower position for America. Accordingly, the government's main goal is to build a global order of trade and economic relations with other nations, as 'tariffs and trade policy have always been a political levy used to shape national economic interest'. Since the Hamiltonians are interest-driven, avoiding wars, keeping good relations with trading partners and preserving a profitable world economic system is fundamental to the Hamiltonian thought.

Second, Mead investigates the idealist and globalist school led by the 28th President of the United States in a period of global unrest after the First World War. The main agenda of the Wilsonian School is humanitarianism and multilateralism. It is dedicated to the spread of peace and the prevention of war. Driven by a belief in the moral obligation of promoting its unique democratic values in the world, Wilsonians put American exceptionalism into practice. The US has the mission of saving other nations from great evils by promoting democracy. The main interest is found in building a world order but 'that order must also be based on principles of democratic government and the protection of human rights' (Mead 139). Thus, the Wilsonian School is universal, driven by the need to spread human rights in an economically prosperous world.

Unlike the previously mentioned schools, the remaining two are not universal but rather specific to America. First, the Jeffersonian School is an idealist and isolationist school of thought. Its focus is directed at domestic welfare and at minimizing foreign relations, by championing an 'America first' strategy. In other words, America should guard a safe space away from the troubled world. The belief in American superior values is advocated by the Jeffersonians who have long perceived the United States as having righteous principles.



However, instead of spreading their values to the world, they are better preserved by following an isolationist agenda. Nevertheless, the presence of a serious threat can justify intervention abroad.

Last but not least, Mead shifts his focus to the realist and isolationist Jacksonian School. It is, the most obstructionist of the schools, the least likely to support Wilsonian initiatives for a better world, the least able to understand Jeffersonian calls for patient diplomacy in difficult situations, or the least willing to accept Hamiltonian trade strategies’.

### **Text6. Detecting Trump’s Foreign Policy Doctrine**

Though specialists are still trying to understand on what basis and under which circumstances Trump builds his views, his pattern of thinking is often labelled as Trumpism (Tanenhaus and Sargent). Trumpism alludes to ambiguity and uncertainty and does not have a common or standard definition. In fact, unlike most of his predecessors, Trump is a president with no prior political or military experience. His strong affiliation with the world of money and media has had a tangible impact on his understanding of the world. The president’s world-view is transactional and business-oriented (Stephens). In fact, Trump does not espouse a sophisticated world-view. As Stephens puts it, Trump’s ‘America First’ agenda ‘draws on populist, isolationist instincts’ since it is based on his renunciation of globalism and adherence to nationalism.

It is still contested whether Trump’s approach to foreign policy is isolationist or internationalist. In a foreign policy speech during his presidential campaign, Trump announced that his intended foreign policy would replace ‘randomness with purpose, ideology with strategy, and chaos with peace.’ The building block of his approach to foreign policy is ‘America first’. For Trump, to make America first at the global arena is to disengage it from the ‘failing’ post-Cold War system, including international treaties and institutions (Curran, 4). In his inaugural address in January 2017, Trump announced that America would ‘shine as an example for everyone to follow’. However, this example should start from a focus on domestic affairs.

This focus on national interests coupled with his rejection of international institutions pushed many political analysts to consider Trump as an isolationist (Brinkley). In fact, Trump announced the end of humanitarian interventions through his harsh critique of the Obama-

Clinton interventionist foreign policy legacies. He also expressed his rejection of George W. Bush's liberal hegemony. Tony Smith describes Trump as 'the most anti-liberal internationalist president' the U.S. has seen since 1940 (quoted in Paterson). On the other hand, Ted Galen Carpenter contends that 'despite the accusations from Trump's critics, Washington remains as hawkish and interventionist as ever.' Hence, Trump is not a full adherent of isolationism nor is he an internationalist.

It may be controversial whether Trump is isolationist or not. However, it is widely agreed that he is a realist. In a foreign policy speech in 2016, Trump announced that 'America First will be the major and overriding theme of [his] administration'. He claimed that his decisions would first and foremost take into consideration 'the interests of American people and American security'. In a rally in Texas in 2018, he laid out his vision saying that, 'a globalist is a person that wants the globe to do well, frankly not caring about the country so much. You know, we can't have that.' Then, he declared himself a 'nationalist'. Theoretically, Trump's approach is realist par excellence since it prioritizes American national interests regardless of humanistic or moralistic considerations.

Trump does not miss any chance to express his opposition to multilateralism. First, he describes Obama's multilateral foreign policy as a total failure. Second, he perceives international institutions as a liability and a threat to the US national interests. Finally, this position was translated into acts during the first months of his presidency as he realized one of his campaign promises to withdraw from different international organizations and treaties. Thus, it is safe to classify his approach as unilateralist.

Trump's impulsive style as a president is the most controversial feature of his presidency. James B. Stewart described his style as a businessman to be 'impetuous, impolitic, and sometimes immature.' This does not differ from his behaviour in the White House. In fact, White House officials are regularly alarmed by his erratic behaviour according to multiple accounts. In 2018, Bob Woodward published *Fear: Trump in the White House*. The book is based on hundreds of hours of interviews with members of the Trump administration. It portrays the President as an impulsive decision-maker, painting a picture of chaos that Woodward claims amounts to a 'nervous breakdown' of the executive branch.

The language and rhetoric employed by Trump are highly problematic. In fact, his informal style, simple language and repetitive insults endow his style with an incontestable uniqueness. The president is also known for his 'alternative facts' and for his unique understanding of events. According to a five-day analysis done by Politico, Trump uttered one fallacy every 3 minutes. Thus, Trump's rhetoric, not far from his personality, is mainly characterized by spontaneity, unpredictability and informality, which adds to the ambiguity of his approach to foreign policy.

It would be fair to argue that Trump's approach to foreign policy does not clearly fit with any of the previously mentioned classical schools. Trump has gone his own way when it comes to conducting foreign policy. The fundamental incoherence is made obvious through Washington's withdrawal from international treaties and agreements. Unsurprisingly, Europeans are increasingly showing open resentment. This weakening of trust could have profound geopolitical implications. Similarly, under Trump's administration, the US–China relationship is turbulent and unstable. In fact, Trump's chaotically aggressive foreign policy concerning China makes it impossible to analyse his foreign policy approach in conventional diplomatic terms. Again, Trump's 'national security' commitment sounds dreary and proves a watershed when it comes to the US–Iran relationship, namely his abandonment of the nuclear deal, which unveiled his unilateralist stance. Such ill-conceived step could undermine US influence in the region and lead to the proliferation of new crises.

Trump's administration has no clear foreign policy pattern. In fact, the President's approach appears to be impulsive, improvisational and devoid of a clear purpose and value as the administration's decisions seem to be erratic, ill-considered and ill-conceived. Since his election Trump's actions, have proved what many observers have long accused him of being – belligerent, rash, chaotic and short-tempered. Trump seems at odds with conventional foreign policy. His actions are bewilderingly unpredictable. He sometimes seeks withdrawal from the world and other times seems capable enough to dominate it and to leverage US strength. Thus, it is hard to separate Trump's flawed character from the policies themselves.

## **Text7. A Trumpian World of Uncertainty**

The rationale of this article stems from an attempt at classifying Trump's foreign policy approach into one of the classical schools. As findings may display, the Trump administration's foreign policy falls short of the different traditional approaches, ranging from isolationism to internationalism, realism to idealism and unilateralism to multilateralism. Trump's theoretical isolationism clashing with his practical interventionism could best be referred to as a Trumpian World of Uncertainty.

Trump once announced the end of humanitarian interventions. In a sudden decision to pull US troops out of Syria from combating Islamic State terrorists on October 23, 2019, President Donald Trump argued, "Let someone else fight over this long-bloodstained sand... the plan is to get out of endless wars, to bring our soldiers back home, to not be policing agents all over the world".

This statement might announce the beginning of the end of the American universal mission. In fact, promising to 'Make America Great Again', Trumpism may break ties with US' hegemonic traditions. The president's repetitive recurrence to isolationism and the absence of specific policy patterns that have long stood since the indoctrination of interventionism raise many questions and put forth the possibility of a post-exceptionalism foreign policy.

Nevertheless, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Turkey, China and North Korea have all been under Trump's crosshairs ever since he was elected head of state. Trump seems to manufacture more enemies by the day. His political incorrectness, coupled with his poor diplomatic and imprecise oratory skills, create tensions that usually end in cross-national conflicts. The ambiguous agenda of a self-proclaimed isolationist who has kept expanding the list of US enemies could be best described as another element of the Trumpian world of uncertainty.

The classical schools were of paramount significance to the myriad of American presidents who took office after the indoctrination of American interventionism in the midst of the Second World War. However, Trump's foreign policy approach, generally, and more often than not, has proved to be incoherent, making the future of American diplomacy hazy and unpredictable. On the one hand, this might herald a new departure for a post-Exceptionalist American foreign policy doctrine that is impulsive yet functional, unpredictable yet realist,

chaotic yet pragmatic. Trumpism could be on its way to thrive as a unique and an atypical form of managing international affairs that favours a more Isolationist and Unilateralist approach, with emphasis on soft power and cutting deals through economic rewards and sanctions rather than military deployment.

On the other hand, this might entail the end of American dominance in world affairs and a shift of power hierarchy from the United States to the hands of emerging superpowers such as China. Trump's demotivation vis-à-vis the international arena and his denouncing of global affairs might halt American supranational dominance. This decline of Pax-Americana may possibly entail the collapse of the current world order and the move to a new one, where US international influence is diminishing. The Trump administration's way of conducting foreign policy might result in the decline of American global dominance as an underlying result of political and economic incompetence.

#### Conclusion

In the hope of untangling this highly complex and ambiguous foreign policy, the synthesis is two fold. First, Trump's paradoxical and ambiguous foreign policy puts forth a new Trumpian Doctrine of Uncertainty, one that is chaotic yet pragmatic, impulsive yet functional, unpredictable yet realist. Second, the implications of such an atypical doctrine may lead to the decline of Pax-Americana, as an outcome of Trump's apathy towards international affairs. This view is supported by Zakaria, who predicted a relative diminishing of American global dominance in the near future. His 'Post-American World' thesis puts forth the possibility of a change in global power hierarchy and a possible shift in the current world order.

Cross-matching Trump's personality with his foreign policy also highlight a tight correlation between both. The president's arrogance, narcissism, anti-intellectualism, populism, belligerence, unpredictability and transactional thinking are reflected in his way of conducting foreign affairs. A critical examination of Trump's personality consolidates that the American foreign policy is a replica of Donald Trump's personality features. The sharp symmetry between the president's traits and his foreign policy agenda, coupled with the absence of a specific underlying school of thought and the incoherence of his statements deem pinpointing policy patterns an impossibility during his tenure.

## **Text8. Opinion – Racial Injustice and the Erosion of America’s Global Standing**

A specter is haunting America, one of centuries-old pathologies never structurally addressed. When the 2020 black lives matter protests began, following the police killing of an unarmed man, George Floyd, in Minneapolis, it should have been a domestic crisis. Instead, the outrage following Floyd’s death, compounded by the scandal-prone leadership of the Trump administration, has quickly turned what was originally an “American tragedy” into an international one with major geopolitical ramifications for years to come. The demonstrations across the world in solidarity with American protestors is just one example of its international dimension. But a more defining factor in the internationalization of this particular saga was surely the violent response by law enforcement officers and the constant attempts to militarize the crisis.

For many, especially those watching from countries and regions that have long been lectured on human rights issues, the whole episode was another indication of a deep-rooted hegemonic hypocrisy – “do as I say, not as I do.” Unsurprisingly, America’s geopolitical adversaries, in a characteristically opportunistic burst, have been quick to jump on the social justice bandwagon to score a few geopolitical points.

Iran branded George Floyd’s death a ‘cold-blooded’ killing that reveals the true nature of the American government. Russia opted for what it usually does: flooding the Internet with divisive messages and seizing the occasion to critique Washington’s ‘repressive’ response to the unrest. Turning the geopolitical dynamics on its head, the Russian Foreign Ministry called on American authorities to respect people’s right to peacefully protest.

China was also quick to jump in despite being reprimanded for its growing totalitarian repression aided by state-of-the-art surveillance technology, epitomized by the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong and mass detentions of its Muslim minority in Xinjiang. But, if in April America was able to issue harsh and scathing criticisms against China while Beijing faced a global outcry over the racial profiling and mistreatment of African nationals during the COVID-19 crisis, the table seems to have turned. Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for China’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, posted ‘I can’t breathe’ on Twitter, referring to George Floyd’s last words that have

become a rallying slogan for demonstrators the world over, while China's state-media have been actively calling on America to address racial injustice at home and stop interfering in other countries' internal affairs.

But the battle between Beijing and Washington extended to Africa, where the two powers have been attempting to undermine each other's broader engagements with and interests in the continent. Nonetheless, it is crucial not to overstate China's role in Africa's perception of race and racism issues in America – issues one could refer to as 'the Great American Question' – if only because the dynamics and the relationship well-outdate China's modern engagement with the continent.

From a historical vantage point, to talk about America is to talk about African slavery. And understanding that tragic history is critical to understanding the reactions in Africa to the Great American Question. In July 1964, Malcolm X brought home to his 'African brothers and sisters' at the first summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) – the predecessor of the African Union (AU) – in Cairo, Egypt, his concerns on the fate of Americans of African descent. Malcolm X's message was a poignant pan-African plea: African-Americans, he said, 'firmly believe that African problems are our problems and that our problems are African problems....' In part, thanks to Malcolm X's moving imploration, the OAU passed a resolution that condemned 'the existence of discriminatory practices' against African-Americans and called on America 'to intensify... efforts to ensure the total elimination of all forms of discrimination based on race, color or ethnic origin.'

This was just one instance of how America's foreign policy towards the continent was complicated by racism at home, a fact John F. Kennedy's Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, once admitted: 'the conduct of our foreign policy is handicapped by our record in the field of civil rights and racial discrimination.'

Decades later, that egregious record still shocks and disheartens many in Africa. So, it was only natural that Floyd's killing drew widespread condemnations in the continent. For instance, the president of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, firmly condemned the murder of George Floyd. In his statement, he recalled the OAU's historic resolution of 1964 to reaffirm 'the rejection by the [AU] of persistent discriminatory practices against black citizens of the United States of America.' Likewise, in an open letter, African writers, 'who are connected beyond geography,' denounced the killing and expressed

their strongest solidarity with the protestors. Such an outpouring of outcries across the continent forced American embassies in Africa to attempt to control the damage by making an unprecedented move to condemn the murder that took place back home.

But given America's long history of racism, enforced and sustained through violence and socio-economic oppression, such diplomatic efforts are destined to achieve very little. At the Democratic Convention in 2004, Barack Obama, an ambitious young African-American senator who would later become America's first black president, told an electrified, charmed audience that central in the American political culture is the conviction that 'all men are created equal.' This, the young senator insisted, made America the only place on earth 'where my story is even possible.' The paradox, however, is that beneath that American exceptionalism also lies the foundation of the Great American Question. And Obama himself surely knows – at least he should – too well how America has long denied its black people the inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness – the basis of the so-called American dream.

Yet that same America has failed to liberate its black people from perpetual oppression and subjugation at home. As a product of that brutal reality, Malcolm X warned his audience at the 1964 Cairo summit on how, to people of color, America could be compared to South Africa's Apartheid regime. Indeed, while the Apartheid regime 'is like a vicious wolf, openly hostile to black humanity...', America is cunning like a fox, friendly and smiling on the surface, but even more vicious and deadly than the wolf.'

In that 1964 African tour, Malcolm X also observed, this time in Ghana, that there is no American dream for America's black citizens. There is only the American nightmare. Today, that nightmare seems to engulf the country and help further tarnish its global standing. The protest and the quickness with which it gained steam might be a clear sign of a troubled nation: Think of the racial injustice, the police brutality, the job losses, and the Covid-19 pandemic, which, instead of being America's great equalizer it was deemed to be, turned out to be a black plague for Black America.

Unfortunately, clear leadership to steer the nation out of these storms has been wanting. 'When the looting starts, the shooting starts' is usually something one associates with some nameless militaristic state on the brink of collapse. But this particular fanning of the flame of



hatred came from Donald Trump himself. Little wonder, some see America becoming a fragile state whose stabilization is off the table in the near term, while others see a much gloomier picture.

### **Text9. Post-Brexit EU Defence Policy: Is Germany Leading towards a European Army? (part 1)**

It is difficult to overstate the impact of Brexit European defence policy – from here onwards referred by the acronym CSDP, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. Indeed, the departure of one of the European Union’s (EU) “Big Three” – to include France and Germany – would always lead to a long term shift in the geopolitical profile of the EU that is still difficult to fully appreciate. Nonetheless, the departure of the United Kingdom (UK), which remains, with France, one of two military powers in Western Europe with nuclear weapons and deployment capabilities outside of Europe (Keohane, 2018) was not necessarily a negative one for the CSDP. However traumatic Brexit has been for the EU, this event also meant the exit of the most reluctant EU member to an autonomous European defence policy outside of NATO.

As last year’s Munich Security Report recognized, the ‘deepening of CSDP was something that London was notoriously reluctant to.’ Already in the year of UK’s referendum to leave the EU, Zandee (2016) has stated that ‘the British vote (...) can open the door to a real strengthening of the CSDP (...) without the blocking position of London.’ In this article, I shall take stock of this prediction and whether or not “real strengthening” has been happening since the UK’s momentous vote.

#### **Germany: The indispensable EU member**

When it comes to the evolution of the political direction of the EU, and in particular the CSDP, one country remains the most influential: Germany. The biggest economy in the EU was almost unanimously considered as the most influential and powerful member state of the EU during the last decade, independently from the source, be it from academic experts, European and global media outlets and senior officials of the EU and other countries (such as Kundnani 2015; Matthijs, 2016; Paterson, 2011; Schweiger, 2014; Stelzenmüller, 2016; The Economist, 2013). Such a leadership, or even according to some, ‘Hegemony’ (Bulmer and Paterson, 2016; Kunz, 2015), which remains a rather charged concept in the realm of International Relations, will not be the

focus of this article. Nonetheless, suffice to say that Germany remains the essential EU country without which, for political, economic, and even strategic reasons no major reforms in the CSDP can advance (Major and Mölling, 2018).

The past ten years, following the Euro crisis of 2009-onwards, was the moment when Germany stood out as the indispensable member of the EU. The crisis provided an opportunity for Germany to assert a clear leadership in defining the EU's policies. This is a trend which would go on in further crises, such as the one following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Daehnhardt, 2015) or the refugee crisis with its height in 2015 (Meiritz, 2015). Even though it had already been an important state in the EU, for instance, in defining the rules for the Economic and Monetary Union in the 1990s (Baun, 1996), Germany exercised its power in the EU in the context of the Franco-German axis – even serving as a junior partner to the French in matters of foreign and security policy (Pachta, 2003).

When it comes to the European defence policy, the turning point for Germany, in hindsight, came in 2014 after the Crimean crisis (Pond, 2015). When Russia invaded another European country it came as a shock to the German establishment (Kwiatkowska-Drożdż and Popławski 2014) – a country traditionally keen on maintaining as close a relationship as possible with Russia for historical and economic reasons (Götz, 2007). However, those strong ties were not enough to deter Berlin from taking a lead role in applying crippling sanctions on the Russian economy (Daehnhardt, 2015; Pond, 2015). Additionally, in the Munich Security Conference of 2014, there were three major speeches delivered by members of the German government on defence policy, notably by its president (Bundespräsidialamt, 2014). These were followed, in 2015, by a statement from the Defence Minister Von Der Leyen that introduced the concept of 'leadership from the middle' [of the EU]. The 2016 'White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr' put to paper those and other speeches by German senior officials and mentioned some of the concepts advanced for the future of German security strategies in previous years.

In the years between the Treaty of Lisbon becoming effective (December 2009) and the Brexit referendum, Germany continued its traditional policy of focusing mainly on NATO as the main field of cooperation in the area of defence (Kunz, 2018; Algieri, Bauer and Brummer, 2006). The successive Merkel governments were not

interested and/or willing in investing more in European defence and in deepening the capabilities of CSDP – not even on the military capabilities of the German army, which suffered years of investment shortfalls. An official report by the Military Commissioner of the German parliament, cited by Deutsche Welle (2018), stated that less than 50% of the main weapons systems of the German armed forces were ready for interventions, or even for training, of the country's military forces.

More importantly, as the abstention in the 2011 Libya operation had shown, Germany's aversion to the use of military force remained an important factor (Brockmeier, 2013). The lack of German leadership at a time when German economic, and even political preponderance, in the EU was unrivalled by any other state meant that a truly integrated European defence had hardly come any closer to being materialized by the wake of the Brexit vote than when the CSDP was originally created in 1999. As Anand Menon considered in 2010 (p.88), 'most Member States share an increasing disillusionment with the CSDP.'

#### Main German interests and preferences for the CSDP

Any analysis of Germany's role in forming the EU's security and defence policy in the wake of Brexit shall begin by establishing the main German interests and preferences for European defence policy – for which the main source will be the German Government itself and namely, the aforementioned most recent "White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr," which is the key German policy document on security policy.

The first priority for Germany concerns the importance of preserving the sovereignty of the entire European continent, by which the country clearly identifies its own security with the security of all its neighbours and fellow EU members. The second priority is the commitment to the further integration of European defence policies. For this regard, Germany's 2016 White Paper: 'strives to achieve the long-term goal of a European Defence and Security Union' that includes 'strengthening the European Defence industry' and 'integration of military and civilian capabilities.' From this second quote, we can deduce a nuance that is important in understanding some of the differences arising with Paris over the future development of the CSDP.

## **Text10. Post-Brexit EU Defence Policy: Is Germany Leading towards a European Army? (part 2)**

Reading between the lines of the White Paper, it seems clear that maintaining unity and cohesion between the entire EU and in cooperation with NATO are the German priorities, even if that entails compromises in the EU that lead to less ambitious initiatives under the CSDP (Algieri, Bauer and Brummer; 2006; Von der Leyen, 2019). On the other hand, France gives absolute priority to augment integrated European military capabilities – its own 2017 Strategic Review document (commissioned after the election of Emmanuel Macron) referring to the need to ‘respond’ effectively to the US request to ‘share the burden’ of military expenditures.

The third priority comes attached to the second: Germany supports a deepening of the CSDP, but not (unlike France, for instance) at the expense of a weakening of its commitment to the NATO alliance, which includes a component of military presence of American troops on German soil (Algieri, Bauer and Brummer; 2006). This is a position that German governments have consistently defended, even under the rather strained bilateral relationship with Washington under President Trump (Erlanger, 2019). In the 2016 White Paper, Germany declares that among its national interests ‘is the strengthening of transatlantic and European security partnerships.’ Thus, for Berlin, maintaining full compatibility with NATO remains the bedrock of its defense policy, arguably trumping (no pun intended) its commitment to the CSDP, at least until now.

Finally, a very important principle for Germany as a normative power, is the defense of what it considers as indispensable values connected to its belonging to the European Union and, in a broader way, the Western world. In the realm of security policy, Germany states in the White Paper its perennial upholding of multilateralist principles, reiterating multiple times its strict respect for multilateral norms. In practice, it states that it should intervene militarily with an international mandate (namely from the UN), helping to put its refusal to intervene in Libya in 2011 in the context of a consistent national policy.

Any self-respecting analysis must go beyond the written words and dive into what is their meaning in an overall strategic sense for Germany’s policy. As such, I believe that one can identify certain principles which guide Germany in the EU. These are summarized in the

table below and will help guide the next stage of this analysis – what policies were actually implemented in the European Defence policy after Brexit and the German influence on those.

Germany and the EU: The main guiding principles (own work)

PESCO: The landmark for a new beginning in the German-shaped CSDP

If one looks back, almost every progress in the European Integration begins with new institutional arrangements, and the post-Brexit renewed push on Defence policy was no exception. In 2003, the EU had published its first European Security Strategy Strategic document as a Union (essentially its own White Papers), and this was replaced in 2016 by a new document written under the authority of then High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini. Even though it is nominally written under the authority of the Commission, this is a policy area where member-states have been reluctant to delegate too much power to Brussels, and the new document necessarily reflects a compromise among all the member-states. The 2016 Global Strategy reflects an intention to bring renewed life to the CSDP, being ‘doubly global, in geographic and thematic terms’ (Zandee, 2016). Several initiatives have been implemented since the Strategy was approved:

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO; 2017)

European Defence Fund (2017)

Military Planning and Conduct Capacity (2017), which is part of the Military Corps of the External Action Service and constitutes the EU’s first permanent operational headquarters, a long-standing Franco-German ambition.

Coordinated Annual Defence Review (2019)

In the Global Strategy, the EU undertakes to achieve ‘strategic autonomy.’ In addition, there is a ‘principle-based pragmatism’ that guides the implementation of the strategy, but again without defining it in detail. In an assessment of this Global Strategy, Bendiek (2016) was critical of the ambiguity of ‘defence cooperation’ proposed for the CSDP ‘without a convincing description of how this great ambition should be achieved under resource scarcity conditions, strategic discord among member states and continued adherence to the consensus commitment in decision making,’ (the consensus rule having been, in my view, a frequent block in more ambitious proposals for the CSDP).

## **Text11.Post-Brexit EU Defence Policy: Is Germany Leading towards a European Army? (part 3)**

The document seeks to balance such ‘strategic autonomy’ with the reiteration of the importance of NATO for the defence of Europe, in a commitment to a majority of ‘Atlanticist’ or strongly pro-NATO member states. In this way, the document refers to the objective of deepening the transatlantic bond and further ensures that NATO remains ‘the primary framework for the majority of Member States, whose defensive planning and development of military capabilities are conducted in full coherence with NATO’s defence planning process’ (European Commission, 2016).

So, this new push in the CSDP is not (yet) ‘Europe taking its fate its own hands,’ as Merkel famously declared it must do in 2017 (in Paravicini, 2017) after the first round of G7 and NATO meeting with US president Donald Trump. Nevertheless, PESCO can indeed be the bedrock foundation for the future of European defence policy, and it was likely the biggest institutional change for the CSDP since its creation at the turn of the century.

PESCO was a mechanism made possible under the concept of Enhanced Cooperation (in which a minimum of 9 member states decide to reinforce cooperation or harmonization in a given area), introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. In Defence, PESCO was created with support from the German government (Major and Mölling, 2018) and institutionalized in 2017. In September 2017, an agreement was made between EU foreign ministers to move forward with PESCO with 10 initial projects. The agreement was signed on November 13 by 23 of the 28 member states. Ireland and Portugal notified the High Representative and the Council of the European Union of their willingness to join PESCO on 7 December 2017, and PESCO was activated by 25 states on 11 December 2017 with the approval of a Council decision (European Council, 2017). Denmark and Malta did not participate, the first being consistent with its position to not participate in the CSDP (Cunningham, 2018). The biggest absentee from PESCO was, of course, the UK, which finally left the EU in 2020.

The description by Major and Mölling (2018) seems to support the view that PESCO has an initiative primarily aimed at combining a will to further EU defence policy, while not hurting internal cohesion; ‘because of German lobbying, PESCO has become an inclusive political

effort (and bureaucratic due to) typical EU procedures and institutions that allowed the participation of all EU states, rather than an exercise focused on (building) capabilities' at the security/military level. According to the same authors, 'France preferred the opposite: an exclusive club for states that are really capable and willing to contribute forces to operations.' Major and Mölling add that, 'Disappointed with a Germanized PESCO, Paris is now shaping its European Intervention Initiative (EI2) outside the EU,' allowing for the inclusion of the UK, which remains as previously mentioned the other largest military power in Western Europe.

France: Indispensable partner, but regular source of disagreement

This is the time to address one of the elephants in the room when it comes to European Defence: even if Germany remains the indispensable EU member, nothing can be done without France's approval – especially not in the matters of defence and security, for which France is arguably still a more capable country than Germany and certainly a less inhibited one for well-known historical reasons. Germany's pacifism was a feature of Cold War times and one that remains until the present day (Bittner, 2019). In 1971, Chancellor Willy Brandt summed up this paradigm in his acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize: 'War is not the ultima ratio but the ultima irritio.'

Since the Brexit vote, France has gone through its own significant political election. In 2017, under the more real threat than ever of the election of the highly Eurosceptic Marine le Pen, Emmanuel Macron was elected President of France with the most pro-Europeanist mandate ever in the Fifth French Republic (The Economist, 2017). In his plan for the "revival" of the EU, strengthening the CSDP was one of the priorities, with Macron also referring to the goal of creating a 'European army', a statement soon echoed by Chancellor Merkel (Brunsden and Chazan, 2018).

Was this a revival of the Franco-German Axis in the realm of defence policy? Perhaps, but the interests of the two states regarding the future of EU Defence remain divergent. In July 2017, the two countries agreed at a bilateral meeting (Koenig and Walter-Franke, 2017) on an ambitious agenda for capabilities in the context of the military operations in Sahel, where France had long been doing the heavy lifting. This was a step in the right direction for European Defence after years of disagreements over military interventions outside Europe and with Paris reportedly becoming increasingly frustrated by Germany (Munich

Security Report, 2019). Cooperation in the Sahel, on paper, should be the perfect combination of the French (military) and German (civil) forces. Nonetheless, a more profound political divide remains between Paris and Berlin, now a matter of an occasional cooperation agreement. Indeed, a close examination of the French and German approaches to defence and security, even after the post-2016 push, reveals that structural differences have not disappeared, particularly with regard to the three dimensions of the current debate on security in Europe, as defined by Kunz (2018), the East vs. South dimension; the definition of the right level of ambition for the CSDP; the question of whether Europe needs a Plan B for its defence in times of an increasingly weakened transatlantic link.

The 2019 Munich Security Report also refers to Franco-German differences:

Contrasting models of European defence cooperation also illustrate different mindsets: for the French, the integration of European defence is a means of strengthening their military power, strengthening military power is the means and improving European integration is the end.

These differences are all the more crucial as they also represent a deeper divide in the geographical security priorities between eastern and southern members or, respectively, the ones more worried and threatened by Russia and the countries traditionally more friendly to Moscow and more concerned with the security issues of the wider Mediterranean basin, like terrorism or even the refugee crisis, depending on the government.

### **Text12.Post-Brexit EU Defence Policy: Is Germany Leading towards a European Army? (part 4)**

The answer to the question that names this article is mostly no, and a true European army remains distant. The ambitious speeches by Chancellor Merkel or even President Macron seem to be premature: the recent rhetoric of creating a European army still lacks the means, structures and institutions that can put it into practice, a situation that is unlikely to change anytime soon. Nevertheless, some of the most recent signs of progress, post-Brexit, appear to go in the direction of a greater importance for the CSDP.

When it comes to what can be foreseen for the short and medium term of European Defence and the German role in it, some conclusions



can be drawn, and the EU and Germany (in cooperation with France and other EU members), have two main decisions to take regarding the future.

One: Regarding their ambitions

‘Today’s European governments face a decision similar to the one that the United States faced in the 1940s: increase their strategic means to meet their collective foreign policy goals or reduce their ambitions to adapt them their limited capabilities’ (Krotz and Maher, 2011, p.573). I consider it unlikely and frankly counterproductive that the EU will be able to avoid this issue indefinitely. The EU, in particular Germany, will have to accept that an increasingly important role at a global level potentially entails painful costs and risks, and has to determine which ones can be tolerable and unacceptable. One of the most positive developments in CSDP is that it finally begins to be debated what the European strategy should be, instead of considering only 27 national strategies. The fact that some of the ambitions set out in the 2016 Global Strategy were translated into concrete initiatives in the following years was a much needed progress.

Obstacles to progress remain ahead; in the harsh assessment of Adrian Hyde-Price, ‘despite the progress made in institutionalizing the CSDP, the military effectiveness and operational performance of EU missions has been disappointingly poor; these missions are almost always small-scale humanitarian aid, operations training and the rule of law in a largely benign and consensual environment. [...] The military production of the CSDP was, therefore, very low.’ This even leads Hyde-Price to ask if the growing number of debates around the European defence are not ‘too much noise for nothing’ (2018, p 400).

Two: Regarding the relationship to be established in the future between the EU’s defence and NATO

At the end of the same year as the Brexit referendum, Donald Trump was elected President of the USA. Traditionally, American leadership within NATO reflected a trade-off between security and autonomy, which has led Washington to accept covering most military costs and resources in exchange for being able to guide general policy within the transatlantic alliance. That might be changing in the future, and one should not forget that the criticism in Washington about what is perceived as a low commitment to NATO by Germany (including not reaching the 2% in Defence expenses) predates President Trump and will likely continue during future administrations – Robert Gates, then

Secretary of Defence of President Obama, warned about the gap ‘between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership but don’t want to share the risks and the costs’ (Shanker, 2011).

The question is, what should Germany and the EU do as a response? France has long been uncomfortable with the trade-off that allows NATO to be the main security guarantee for Europe, while Germany traditionally has accepted and even welcomed it. Why? In my views, that is in no small part because it allows Berlin to avoid difficult questions about its defence policy and capabilities while its security is guaranteed in the middle of a secure and peaceful Europe. As Trump’s recent threats to withdraw US troops in Germany show (Hill, 2020), Berlin can no longer avoid at least considering these questions.

The discomfort with the new unilateralism (“America First” and the devaluing of NATO) by President Trump have led to successive public statements by German leaders in favour of a more autonomous European defence, namely the aforementioned Merkel declaration of the need for Europeans to take the future into their own hands; furthermore, Germany has used its leadership to go past the speeches into concrete action, namely with PESCO, which promises to shape the future of the CSDP for at least the next decade under a Germany-promoted concept of inclusive vision for all members of the EU. If France and Germany convince the rest of the EU members that they must strengthen their own defence capacity in order to gain greater autonomy from Washington, the evolution of the CSDP can accelerate significantly in the medium term.

The biggest test, as always, will be if EU member states are willing to put their money where their mouths are and to accept an increase in defence budget costs, a choice that many EU countries, starting with Germany, seem to remain very reluctant to take. They may no longer afford this luxury in the years to come when the world seems more and more dominated by security threats and Great Powers competitions.

### **Text13. Covid-19: Learning the Hard Way**

For months now, we have been bombarded by images of Italians and Spaniards in lockdown expressing solidarity from their balconies, of Jacinda Ardern speaking to New Zealanders from her home, of migrants workers being offered food and shelter in the Indian state of Kerala, of

South Korean quarantine kits comprising masks, food and water and much more. Understandably, public interest so far has focused on the most visible aspects of the pandemic response. By looking at empty streets and the number of people wearing masks it was easy to draw comparisons between different countries. And yet, there is another dimension which is just as crucial, but not as tangible – the timeliness of a country’s policy response to the Covid-19 emergency is an even stronger predictor of whether a country has succeeded in preventing death and suffering than the stringency of such measures. This was evident to epidemiologists who are familiar with the exponential way epidemics such as Covid-19 spread; but less so to the general public and policy-makers around the world. In this article, we aim to redress the imbalance of attention between timeliness and stringency.

The key question to be asked then is what made some countries quicker than others in taking measures against the spread of Covid-19. What explains the “success stories” across Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, and Singapore? What caused the surprisingly high infection and death rates in the UK, US, Italy, France, and Spain? Scholars of comparative politics have attempted to explain this variation using a set of traditional structural variables: regime type, state capacity, type of leadership, and social buy-in. Some even attribute the successes to an Asian culture that values the community more than individuals. However, these predictors don’t perform well in predicting adequate government response in the Covid-19 crisis. The line between success and failure is not one between authoritarianism and democracy, one between sturdy and weak institutions, or one between communal or individualistic cultures. These variables fail to account for many striking cases in this pandemic: Singapore, as a somewhat authoritarian state, didn’t seem to suffer from the information strain that was supposed to hinder its prompt response; free national health systems in the UK and Italy didn’t prevent some of their hospitals from reaching capacity only a few days into the emergency; Japan, the only country that has yet to enforce any social distancing measures, has kept the virus under control; and Germany, whose population has shown low tolerance for social isolation, seems to be winning its battle against Covid-19.

In the search for a satisfactory explanation as to why some democratic states with strong capacity failed to cope with challenges posed by the Covid-19 crisis, scholars have to depart from conventional variables and consider the role of behavioral and psychological variables

– how do the elite and the public perceive such a threat at its emergence and as it develops. Even with the lack of long-range planning and investment, governments’ short-range response could change the trajectory of epidemics. As soon as the novel coronavirus was identified, governments had the option to conduct a quick but comprehensive review of national Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) requirements. Learning from the experience of other countries, some governments put in place a comprehensive testing-manufacturing capability and implemented testing and contact tracing while the number of cases was still low. These short-range behavioral responses determine whether a country could contain the virus wherever it cropped up.

Previous experience is key in driving a timely policy response: at the governmental level, it reduces the uncertainty associated with the choice among several policy options, speeding up the policy-making process. From the public perspective, it heightens the alertness of individuals and promotes higher levels of compliance with precautionary behaviors. In addition, it also increases public demand for policies that prioritize public health over economic and social concerns, thus further legitimating the government’s swift response. Experience of outbreaks of SARS-Cov in 2003 and MERS-Cov in 2015 provides cognitive short cuts and enables a timely response. The key role of previous exposure in shaping a country’s performance in the present emergency is at the same time a humbling lesson and a reason for hope that when similar challenges arise in the future policymakers around the world will be able to respond in a timely fashion.

It seems to be a popular belief that countries and regions including Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand succeeded in containing the spread by enforcing stringent social isolation at high costs in disrupting their socio-economic activities. However, figure 1 shows otherwise. Using the Oxford Coronavirus Government Response Tracker, we plot the maximum stringency level that governments enforced in social isolation during the Covid-19 crisis. Among all the countries considered, Taiwan had the least stringent social isolation even at the peak of infections, while Hong Kong, Macao, South Korea, Thailand, and Singapore all differ significantly in the maximum level of stringency reached with their social distancing measures. Contrary to the popular belief, lockdown in Taiwan, Macao, and Hong Kong were not as stringent as those in most European and North American countries at their climax. Thus, maximum stringency alone – or how costly a

lockdown is – does not predict a successful performance at combating Covid-19.

The Covid-19 virus spreads almost exponentially, which makes it hard to contain in today's globalized and tightly connected society. Over the last few months, we have seen how rapidly it is transmitted and how hard and costly it is to sever social interactions, once the virus starts spreading locally. Even when a stringent policy of social isolation is implemented, there is a lag between the moment the policy is introduced and the time at which the spread is effectively contained. Better policy timing, therefore, seems to be the key to containment. "Prevention is better than the cure" is a mantra that is often repeated by healthcare workers and scientists alike. With the Covid-19 pandemic, its implications have never been more real. Epidemiologists know very well that the crucial moment for the successful containment of an epidemic is at its early phases, when it remains a 'potential' pandemic and not already a given fact. At this pivotal stage, the most effective measures are not necessarily the most stringent, but rather those that give the most precise picture of the state of affairs: identifying the virus and estimating its infectivity rate, and implementing contact tracing and population screening measures are all examples of an early-stage, precautionary approach. Whether these measures are successfully implemented depends on the timing of the government, but also on the compliance of the public at a time when the virus has not caused too much damage, yet.

#### **Использованные Интернет-ресурсы:**

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